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The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption 
where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with 
their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint (with public 
goods evaluated at Lindahl prices). The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are 
used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income 
shares. The proposed game generalizes both the `collective' model of household behavior and the 
non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods. 
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assumed by the authors.  1 Introduction
This paper addresses the issue of group behavior for a set of individuals consum-
ing both privately and jointly. It presents a model speci￿cally formulated for
simplicity in terms of two-person household behavior, but which can be straight-
forwardly extended to larger groups. The natural starting point of such analysis
is to discard the so-called unitary approach, which assumes that the household
acts as if it were maximizing a single utility function, possibly a well-de￿ned
social welfare function.
Two alternative non-unitary approaches have been used in the literature on
household behavior:1 the fully cooperative, which entails Pareto-e¢ ciency of
household decisions, and the fully non-cooperative, with household decisions re-
sulting from a Nash equilibrium of some game where each individual maximizes
utility under a personal budget constraint. The ￿rst approach started with mod-
els based on axiomatic bargaining theory (Manser and Brown, 1980, McElroy
and Horney, 1981), which result in Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes varying according
to the speci￿ed threat point, itself possibly determined by the solution of a non-
cooperative game (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, Chen and Woolley, 2001). Subse-
quent papers proposed ￿ collective￿models in order to explore the restrictions on
observable household behavior implied by the assumption of Pareto e¢ ciency,
without explicitly referring to a speci￿c bargaining or other decision making
process (Chiappori, 1988, 1992, Browning and Chiappori, 1998). The second
approach is based on two types of non-cooperative games, generally leading to
ine¢ cient equilibrium outcomes. In the ￿rst type each individual is supposed
to be responsible for a ￿ separate sphere￿of joint consumption (Lundberg and
Pollak, 1993). In the second type, each individual voluntarily contributes to any
public good (Ulph, 1988, Chen and Woolley, 2001, Lechene and Preston, 2005,
Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006).
In this paper, we want to propose a more general strategic approach, which
1A synthesis of the ￿eld is provided by Donni (2008b). See also Donni (2008a) for a general
presentation of the so-called ￿ collective￿models of household behavior.
2includes as sub-cases fully cooperative solutions and fully non-cooperative equi-
librium outcomes, together with intermediate cases. This more general approach
will provide a double parameterization of the set of equilibria, in terms of the
income distribution between the two spouses (allowing to move along the utility
possibility frontier) and in terms of their autonomy in spending decisions (im-
plying downward movements below that frontier, as autonomy increases). The
two extreme cases, the one where both spouses have full autonomy and the one
where they have none, correspond to a fully non-cooperative and a fully cooper-
ative outcome, respectively. By ￿lling the gap between these two extreme cases,
our approach provides a theoretical development that has already been hoped
for in the literature.2
The autonomy we are referring to is related to the way in which the house-
hold organizes its ￿nances. An important distinction appearing in empirical
sociological studies (for instance two surveys of the International Social Survey
Programme of 1994 and 2002, analyzing representative samples of 38 coun-
tries) is the one between money management ￿systems in which couples operate
more or less as single economic units￿ and ￿individualized or privatized sys-
tems in which couples operate largely as two separate, autonomous economic
units￿(Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2006, Pahl, 2008). The former com-
prehend systems in which all the household money is managed by one of the
two spouses, except possibly some personal spending money left to the other
spouse, but also systems (used by more than a half of the couples surveyed by
2For instance, in a recent paper focusing on the household decisions concerning labor
supply, Delboca and Flinn (2006) write: "We view labor supply outcomes as either being
associated with a particular utility outcome on the Pareto frontier (the one chosen under
symmetric Nash bargaining) or to be associated with the noncooperative equilibrium point.
In reality there are a continuum of points that dominate the noncooperative equilibrium point
and that do not lie on the Pareto frontier, however developing a model that allows such
outcomes to enter the choice set of the household seems beyond our means" (pp. 1-2). Cf.
also Lechene and Preston (2005): "neither the assumption of fully e¢ cient cooperation nor
of complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely accurate description of typical
household spending behaviour and analysis of such extreme cases can be seen as a ￿rst step
towards understanding of a more adequate model" (p. 19).
3the ISSP) in which all the household money is pooled in a common bank ac-
count and managed jointly by the two spouses, not necessarily on a 50-50 basis.
These systems a⁄ord a good illustration of the economic household models of
both the unitary and the fully cooperative approaches. In contrast with them,
we ￿nd two kinds of individualized systems. The ￿rst one is the ￿ independent
management system￿in which each spouse keeps his/her own income separate
and has responsibility for di⁄erent items of household expenditure. This system
may be easily approached by fully non-cooperative economic household models
displaying ￿ separate spheres￿ , either exogenously or endogenously. The other
individualized system (used by 13% of the couples in the ISSP 1994 survey,
17% in the 2002 survey) is ￿the partial pool in which couples pool some of their
income to pay for collective expenditure and keep the rest separate to spend as
they choose￿(Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins, 2006).3
In our approach, the autonomy of each spouse can be evaluated in terms of
the proportion of his/her contribution to collective expenditure which is directly
e⁄ected through individual purchases in the market, hence properly ￿ spent as
he/she chooses￿ . The rest of collective expenditure is supposed to be paid from
a ￿ pool￿of ￿nancial contributions of the spouses computed according to Lin-
dahl prices corresponding to their relative incomes. The degree of autonomy
of each partner may be preliminarily agreed upon within the household or else
be determined by social norms. But it may also emerge spontaneously as one
of the characteristics of a speci￿c equilibrium of a non-coperative game played
by the spouses. We assume that in such game they both have to take into
account not only their own personal budget constraint, but also the collective
budget constraint computed at Lindahl prices. At equilibrium, the weight of
each constraint is evaluated by a Lagrange multiplier, and the relative weight
3The terminology ￿ partial pooling￿or else ￿ joint pooling￿ , applied by sociologists to speci￿c
systems of ￿nancial management within the household, should not be confused with the
terminology ￿ income pooling￿used by economists to designate situations in which households
behave as if their income was pooled, so that it does not matter which member receives the
income (see Bradbury, 2004, p.504).
4of the personal constraint may be taken as an index of the degree of autonomy
attained by the corresponding spouse.4
In section 2, we will brie￿ y present the household decision model, in both
its cooperative and non-cooperative versions, and develop our own general non-
cooperative approach. In section 3, we will analyze local and observable prop-
erties of the household demand function which may be used to discriminate
among the di⁄erent regimes of household behavior. In section 4, we will exploit
an example already used by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006), in order
to illustrate the implications of varying degrees of autonomy. We conclude in
section 5.
2 The household decision model
We study a two-adult household, consuming goods that are either private or





+ be the vector of consumption by the two members of
n private goods and Q 2 Rm
+ the consumption vector of m public goods. The




, which is de￿ned on Rn
+￿Rm
+, increasing and strongly quasi-concave.5
Each member J of the household is supposed to receive an initial income Y J ￿ 0.
The total income of the household is Y = Y A + Y B. We want to study how
the household decides on its total consumption given the vector of private good
prices p 2 Rn
++ and the vector of public good prices P 2 Rm
++. The ￿rst
private good, assumed to be desired in any household environment, is taken as
numØraire (p1 = 1).
4A similar procedure has been used to parameterize the set of equilibria of oligopolistic
games by d￿ Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and GØrard-Varet (2007) and by d￿ Aspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009).
5For simplicity, we shall stick to the egoistic case where the utility of each spouse only
depends upon his/her own consumption, either private or public.
52.1 The e¢ cient intra-household decision approach
If a collective point of view is adopted inside the household, and a Pareto-optimal
decision is looked for, the usual approach is to ￿x a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] and














+ PQ ￿ Y . (1)
All the Pareto-optimal decisions can be characterized by varying the Pareto
weight ￿. According to the speci￿c collective decision process (e.g. Nash bar-
gaining with a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium as the threat point), the Pareto
weight may depend upon the environmental variables (p;P;Y ) as well as on dis-
tributional factors, either environmental or not, but not a⁄ecting the individual
preferences (e.g. parameters determining the threat point). As well discussed
in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006a), if the Pareto weight is indepen-
dent of (p;P;Y ), while possibly depending on distributional factors, then the
e¢ cient intra-household decision approach reduces to the unitary model, in the
sense that the household decides as a single decision unit, maximizing under the
common budget constraint pq + PQ ￿ Y the utility function










where the function e U may be a⁄ected at most by the distributional factors.
However, as soon as the Pareto weights do depend on the environmental vari-
ables (p;P;Y ) (e.g. through the determination of the threat point), the function
e U becomes a ￿ generalized￿utility function, depending through ￿ on prices and
household income, so that the collective model must indeed be distinguished
from the unitary model.
For every J, let ￿J ￿
qJ;Q
￿
denote the marginal-willingness-to-pay vector for











6Under usual regularity conditions, the Pareto-optimal decisions (corresponding









together with the budget condition p
￿
qA + qB￿
+ PQ = Y . With each such
solution (corresponding to some value of ￿), one can thus associate Lindahl (or
personalized) prices
PJ ￿ ￿J ￿
qJ;Q
￿
, J = A;B (5)
(such that PA + PB = P) and individual expenditures
￿JY ￿ pqJ + PJQ (6)
(such that ￿A + ￿B = 1). Both the Lindahl prices and the expenditure shares
￿J (J = A;B) are functions of (￿;p;P;Y ) 2 [0;1] ￿ R
n+m
++ ￿ R+ (where ￿ may
itself depend upon (p;P;Y )). In particular, we may take ￿A = ￿(￿;p;P;Y ) as
the sharing rule applying to the household, and interpret PJQ as J￿ s tribute to
the household expenditure in public goods.
In the following, we are going to reverse this procedure and start, for a










+ (where QJ denotes
the vector of public consumptions desired by J), such that









e qJ; e QJ
￿
(7)
s.t. pqJ + PJQJ ￿ Y J;
(ii)
PA + PB = P and QA = QB = Q. (8)
6Notice that this income distribution depends upon environmental factors but may itself
be determined by the distribution of power within the household.





be obtained, according to the second welfare theorem, in a ￿ decentralized￿way,
together with the corresponding Pareto weights (which we will leave implicit).
For the sake of later comparisons, recall the ￿rst order conditions for a









pqJ + PJQJ = Y J, (9)
with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or any public good k s.t.
QJ
k > 0. Together with condition (ii) in the de￿nition of a Lindahl equilibrium,
they entail the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson conditions for any interior solution.
2.2 The fully non-cooperative approach
An alternative non-unitary model of household decisions is non-cooperative,7
with each spouse having full autonomy in allocating income to public consump-
tion. More precisely, we may de￿ne a game with voluntary contributions to






noting J0s private consumptions and gJ his/her contributions to public goods)








s.t. pqJ + PgJ ￿ Y J.
A Nash equilibrium of this game can be characterized by the ￿rst order condi-
tions (for J = A;B):
1







pqJ + PgJ = Y J, (11)
7See Ulph (1988), Chen and Woolley (2001), Lechene and Preston (2005), Browning, Chi-
appori and Lechene (2006).
8with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or any public good k s.t.
gJ
k > 0.
This approach is in sharp contrast with the cooperative approach where each
individual has to choose the same aggregate quantity of each public good (in the
centralised version), so as to maximise a collective objective, determined by the
Pareto weights. In that collective approach, the spouses loose their autonomy in
allocating income to public consumption. Even in the decentralised version of
the e¢ cient household decision approach, the spouses contribute to the collective
acquisition of public goods by paying a tribute computed according to Lindahl
prices imposed upon them.
Both household decision processes, the Pareto e¢ cient behavior (whether
centralised or decentralised) and the fully non-cooperative behavior, appear as
extreme in terms of the autonomy left to the individuals. In reality, intermediate
forms of household behavior, with for instance incomes partially transferred to
a common bank account for collective decisions, can often be observed. In order
to cover such intermediate forms, we will combine the two approaches in the
next subsection.
2.3 The non-cooperative approach with Lindahl prices
We let each spouse decide under two di⁄erent budget constraints, one personal,
the other collective, together with a feasibility vector constraint stating that
the desired public consumptions cannot be higher than the sum of the spouses￿
planned contributions. To be explicit, let us de￿ne a household game with
Lindahl prices, associated with the environment (p;P;Y ) 2 R
n+m









+ . Each spouse J 2 fA;Bg is supposed to choose
a vector of private consumptions qJ 2 Rn
+, a vector of voluntary contributions
to public goods gJ 2 Rm














+ PAQA + PBQB ￿ Y
QJ ￿ gA + gB.
The ￿rst constraint is the personal budget constraint, stating that the individual
income of spouse J should be enough to ￿nance his/her private consumption
plus the value, at market prices P, of his/her contribution to public consump-
tion. The second constraint is the collective budget constraint, stating that
the household income should be enough to cover the sum of the two private
expenditures plus the value of the desired public consumption. This value is
computed for each spouse J and each public good k by applying the Lindahl
price PJ
k to the desired public consumption QJ
k. The third constraint ensures
the consistency of the two budget constraints, by restraining the desired public
consumptions to be at most equal to the sum of the voluntary contributions of
the two spouses.






that solve both individual programmes simultaneously and
satisfy the feasibility constraints of the two spouses as equalities (QA = QB =
gA + gB), is called a household behavioral equilibrium.





sociated with Lindahl prices
￿
PA;PB￿
, all the constraints in (12), for J = A;B,
are satis￿ed as equalities.
Proof. The feasibility constraint is satis￿ed as an equality by de￿nition of
a household behavioral equilibrium. By adding the two personal budget con-
straints and using PA + PB = P, we see that the collective budget constraint
can be satis￿ed as a strict inequality only if one at least of the personal con-
straints, say the one of spouse A, is a strict inequality at equilibrium. But, in
10this case, A could increase her utility by increasing simultaneously QA and gA.
Finally, if the collective budget constraint is satis￿ed as an equality, so are both
personal budget constraints.
The ￿rst order conditions characterizing for agent J a household behaviorial






























with equality for any coordinate i (resp. k) s.t. qJ








with equality for any coordinate k s.t. gJ
k > 0. We thus obtain, for private good















with equality if qJ
i > 0. Also, the marginal willingness to pay public good
























with equality if gJ







is simply a normalized Lagrange multiplier associated with the personal budget
constraint.







2 can be used to parameterize the
set of household behavioral equilibria. A Lindahl equilibrium outcome and the
outcome of a Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contributions to
public goods are also outcomes of two extreme elements of this set, as formally
stated in the following proposition.











with Q = QA = QB is the outcome of a household behavioral equilibrium char-
acterized by ￿
A = ￿




11behavioral equilibrium characterized by ￿
A = ￿
B = 1 is a Nash equilibrium of
the game with voluntary contributions to public goods.
Proof. The collective constraint in programme (12) can be expressed as pqJ +
PJQJ ￿ Y J +
￿
Y ￿J ￿ pq￿J ￿ P￿JQ￿J￿
, the expression in parentheses being
nil if we take the Lindahl equilibrium values P￿J, Q￿J and q￿J. Since the
personal budget constraints are not binding if ￿
A = ￿
B = 0, we can thus make
programmes (12) coincide with programmes (7) characterizing the Lindahl equi-




is a household behav-
ioral equilibrium if the vectors gA and gB satisfy gA+gB = Q and PgA = PAQ
(m￿ + 1 equations with 2m￿ unknowns, where m￿ is the number of actually




is a household behavioral equilibrium characterized by
￿
A = ￿
B = 1, the collective budget constraint is not binding for both spouses,






solve the two programmes (10) of the
game with voluntary contributions to public goods.








shadow price associated with the personal budget constraint, may be seen as
representing the degree of autonomy of spouse J. Indeed, equilibria with larger
and larger values of ￿
J imply that J is more and more concerned with his/her
own personal budget, relative to the collective budget.
In this analysis, up to now, the degrees of autonomy of both spouses are
￿xed endogenously, ex post, as characteristics of a speci￿c equilibrium. We
may however invert the approach, and take the parameters as preliminarily and
conventionally ￿xed, ex ante, within the household. To de￿ne the new corre-
sponding game, one can assume that each spouse J contributes to the funding
of public goods in two ways. On the one hand, J spends autonomously in the
market place a share ￿
J 2 [0;1] of the market value of his/her contribution to
public consumption: ￿
JPgJ. On the other hand, J remits to a common account,
designed to ￿nance public expenses in which both spouses concur, the comple-
mentary share of the value, now at Lindahl prices, of his/her contribution to
12public consumption. This value is the sum of spouse J￿ s Lindahl tax on his/her
planned contribution (PJgJ) plus the Lindahl tax the other spouse would have
to pay on what she/he would like J￿ s contribution to be (P￿J ￿
Q￿J ￿ g￿J￿
).
Notice that by aggregating these values over the two spouses, we obtain, as
expected, the sum of the two Lindahl taxes:
PAgA + PB ￿
QB ￿ gB￿
+ PBgB + PA ￿
QA ￿ gA￿
= PAQA + PBQB. (17)
The new game, which we shall call in the following the ￿-household game, has the























PJgJ + P￿J ￿
Q￿J ￿ g￿J￿￿
￿ Y J,
QJ ￿ gA + gB.
As will become clear in the following proposition, this programme di⁄ers
from programme (12) only in so far as the personal and the collective budget
constraints are now merged into a single personal budget constraint. We show
that the equilibria of the two games coincide for the same value of ￿.




is a household behavioral equi-






if and only if it is an equilib-
rium of the ￿-household game.
Proof. First notice that, since UJ is increasing, any solution to programme (??)




of the ￿-household game necessarily
satis￿es QA = QB = Q = gA + gB. Using in addition the equality P = PA +
PB, we then see that the budget equation of the ￿-household game coincides











PJgJ + P￿J ￿
Q￿J ￿ g￿J￿￿
= PgJ.
13Also, the aggregation of the two budget equations naturally results in the col-




= PAQA + PBQB.
Finally, by simply reproducing the argument applied to programme (12), we see
that the equilibrium of the ￿-household game must satisfy the following ￿rst

















with an equality for any private good i s.t. qJ
i > 0 or for any public good
k s.t. gJ
k > 0 (implying Qk > 0). These are exactly the ￿rst order condi-
tions of a household behavioral equilibrium (see 15 and 16). Consequently,
there is a complete coincidence of all the conditions that must be satis￿ed for
￿
qA;gA;QA;qB;gB;QB￿
to be a household behavioral equilibrium associated
with the parameter values ￿
A and ￿
B, and to be a ￿-household game with the
same parameter values now exogenously ￿xed.
2.4 Separate spheres and local income pooling
Two properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods, proved by Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006b), are
that there is generically at most one public good to which both spouses con-
tribute (separate spheres up to one) and that, in the case they both contribute
to one public good, income redistributions have locally no e⁄ect on household
expenditures (local income pooling). The ￿rst property (Proposition 1 in Brown-
ing, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006b)8 can be extended to household behavioral
equilibria (as well as to equilibria of the ￿-household game), except in the ex-
treme Lindahl equilibrium case where the degree of autonomy vanishes for both
members of the household (￿
A = ￿
B = 0):
8The result is only ￿ generic￿ , and does not apply in speci￿c cases, for instance when indi-
vidual preferences over the public goods are identical, as in Lechene and Preston (2005).
14Proposition 4 Take any household behavioral equilibrium characterized by (en-






6= (0;0), and let m￿ (m￿ ￿ m) be the
number of public goods actually consumed by the household, of which mJ are
contributed by spouse J (J = A;B). Then, generically, either mA + mB = m￿
or mA + mB = m￿ + 1: there is at most one public good to which both spouses
contribute.















and corresponding Lindahl prices
￿
PA;PB￿
. As all con-
straints in the agents￿programmes (12) are satis￿ed as equalities at equilibrium,
each vector qJ must maximise J￿ s utility UJ (￿;Q) under the constraint pqJ = yJ




to the prices p of private goods. The m￿ positive coordinates of Q and the two
















corresponding to any good k s.t. gJ
k > 0 (for J = A;B), together with the
household budget constraint yA +yB = Y ￿PQ. Hence, we have mA +mB +1
equations in m￿ + 2 unknowns. Except in the case of a Lindahl equilibrium
(corresponding to ￿
A = ￿



















k for any k s.t. Qk > 0, there is overdetermination
if mA + mB > m￿ + 1: a solution can then only exist for singular parameter
values. It is moreover clear that m￿ ￿ mA +mB, which completes the proof.
By contrast, the second property, that of local income pooling (Proposition
2 in Browning, Chiappori and Lechene, 2006b) does not generalize, and can
only be obtained in the extreme case of full autonomy of the two spouses (￿
A =
￿





nB +m￿ positive consumptions is fully determined by nA +nB ￿2+mA +mB
FOC equations (15) and (16), plus the collective budget equation, provided
mA+mB = m￿+1 (joint contribution to some public good k). Personal budget
15equations can then be used to determine the two individual contributions gA
k
and gB
k in Qk. However, contrary to what happens in the full autonomy case,
a change in the income distribution ￿ in￿ uences through the Lindahl prices PA
k
and PB
k each spouse￿ s willingness to pay the public goods, and eventually the
equilibrium outcome. Hence, the local income pooling property appears in our
context as a symptom of fully non-cooperative behavior, lost as soon as we inject
some dose of cooperation.
3 Local properties of household demand
The purpose of this section is to characterize the properties of demand functions
that could be observable and used for discriminating among the di⁄erent types
of household behavior: full cooperation (Browning and Chiappori, 1998), full
autonomy (Lechene and Preston, 2008) and intermediate types, involving partial
autonomy of the two spouses.
3.1 Foundations of the demand functions








two spouses, associated with a given environment (￿;Y ) ￿ (p;P;Y ) 2 R
n+m+1
+ ,






Y ￿ (￿;1 ￿ ￿)Y , and corre-





of the other spouse, the Marshallian conditional demand function of spouse
J 2 fA;Bg can be straightforwardly derived, from his/her utility maximisation










pqJ + PJgJ ￿ YJ,



















(which will in general be omitted, for sim-
plicity of notation, as arguments of the functions to be introduced in the fol-
16lowing), and consider environment perturbations. More precisely, take an open
set ￿ ￿ R
n+m+1
+ of environment values, with associated Lindahl price functions
PJ : ￿ ! Rm
+, such that the public goods actually purchased by each spouse
(corresponding to the non-zero elements of equilibrium vectors gA and gB) are
the same for each element of this set (that is, such that there is no regime switch-






6= (0;0), we assume equilibrium uniqueness for any
element of ￿, so that we can refer to the functions GJ : ￿ ! Rm
+ (J = A;B), as-
sociating with each environment the individual contributions to public consump-











, so that we must introduce a selection
￿
GA;GB￿
: ￿ ! R2m
+
such that, according to the proof of Proposition 2, the two functions add
up to the household consumption and are such that, for any (￿;Y ) 2 ￿,
PGA (￿;Y ) = PA (￿;Y )
￿
GA (￿;Y ) + GB (￿;Y )
￿
.





as de￿ned above, we thus take the arguments PJ, YJ and g￿J as functions of











P￿J (￿;Y )GJ (￿;Y ) and g￿J = G￿J (￿;Y ). We are thus
assuming that UJ has the usual properties required to ensure di⁄erentiability
9The uniqueness assumption is incompatible with the non-generic case of joint contribution
to more than one public good. Indeed, take equilibrium values
￿
b gA;b gB￿
such that b gA
k and
b gB
k are both positive for any k in some set K of public goods. Clearly, we see by simple
inspection of the spouses￿programmes, that a replacement of elements b gA




k satisfying, for any k 2 K, gA
k +gB
k = b gA
k +b gB






































will lead to another equilibrium with the same outcome. We thus obtain a system of #K + 2
equations (of which only #K + 1 are independent) in 2(#K) unknowns. Uniqueness conse-
quently requires #K ￿ 1. Lechene and Preston (2008) also rely on the uniqueness assumption,
but with a slightly di⁄erent game where each spouse J chooses, rather than his/her own con-
tribution gJ, his/her preferred household consumption QJ (which should not be less than
g￿J), with QA = QB = Q at equilibrium.
17of xJ.
3.2 Full cooperation (￿
A = ￿
B = 0)
Consider individual demands ￿
A and ￿






p;PJ (￿;Y );￿JY ￿ PJ (￿;Y )G￿J (￿;Y );G￿J (￿;Y )
￿
(20)
and, recalling that ￿A = ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿B, the corresponding household demand
￿ (￿;Y;￿) ￿ ￿
A (￿;Y;￿) + ￿
B (￿;Y;1 ￿ ￿).
In the case of the unitary model with a ￿xed Pareto weight ￿, the Lindahl prices
PA and PB allowing for decentralization of the spouses￿decisions are indeed
functions of the environment (￿;Y ) alone, and so are the selections GA and GB.
Of course, expenditure shares ￿J = ￿￿
J=Y must then be adjusted to changes
in the environment by lump sum transfers between the two spouses, so that we
are in fact referring to the individual demand functions
￿
J





and to the corresponding household demand function
￿￿ (￿;Y ) ￿ ￿
A
￿ (￿;Y ) + ￿
B
￿ (￿;Y ). (22)
The household demand has of course the usual properties of Marshallian demand











individual demands, they have the household income Y as an argument and
income e⁄ects correspondingly work through household income. This means
that a compensation of those e⁄ects at the household level so as to leave the
household utility constant also ensures constancy of individual utilities, which
are just ￿xed shares ￿A and ￿B of household utility. As a consequence, the
individual demand ￿
J
￿ also has the usual properties of Marshallian demand,















, where @Y ￿
J
￿ is a partial
18derivative with respect to household income, the income e⁄ects being evaluated
relative to household expenditure ￿￿. Thus, from the de￿nition of household





obtain: ￿￿ = ￿A
￿ + ￿B
￿ .
By using the de￿nition (21) of these individual demand functions, we may
also make explicit in the expression of the Slutsky matrix ￿￿ the adjustment of






















In the collective model, with ￿xed income distribution given by the parameter
￿ and an implicit Pareto weight varying with the environment, the e⁄ects de-
scribed by the matrix ￿ of the adjustment in the income distribution required to
keep ￿ ￿xed are absent. As a consequence, the household demand ￿ (￿;Y;￿) has




di⁄ering from the genuine
Slutsky matrix ￿￿ of ￿￿ (￿;Y ) by the deviation matrix ￿, an outer product,
hence with rank at most equal to 1, an observation that reproduces Browning
and Chiappori (1998) main result. We may be more precise about the expression
of ￿ in terms of individual demands xA and xB.
Proposition 5 Under full cooperation (￿
A = ￿
B = 0), the household demand
function ￿ (￿;Y;￿) = ￿
A (￿;Y;￿) + ￿
B (￿;Y;1 ￿ ￿) has a pseudo-Slutsky matrix
￿ which deviates from a Slutsky matrix ￿￿ by an outer product, which can be









Proof. It remains to show that the two expressions of ￿, in (23) in terms
of ￿
A and ￿
B and in (24) in terms of xA and xB, are equivalent. By using
￿(￿;Y ) = (1=Y )￿￿
A
￿ (￿;Y ), we can compute:
































































































By Euler￿ s identity applied to ￿
A
￿, a homogeneous function of degree 0, we see
that this expression is nil, so that we are left with




































Finally, by referring to the de￿nition of ￿


















by just making the values of ￿
J
￿ and xJ coincide.
It should be emphasized that the deviation ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ is independent of
the existence of any public consumption. It results from an aggregation e⁄ect,
working in the general case where there is no representative consumer.
3.3 Full autonomy (￿
A = ￿
B = 1)
The pseudo-Slutsky matrix of the household demand function ￿￿ ￿ ￿
A + ￿
B
(now ￿ for notational simplicity) can be easily decomposed by detailing the
di⁄erent e⁄ects of the environment through the arguments of the sum xA +xB.




































































The Slutsky matrices ￿A and ￿B of the individual demand functions xA and
xB express the direct e⁄ects of a change in the environment on individual opti-
mizing decisions. Their sum ￿ has also the properties of a Slutsky matrix. The
matrix ￿ is an outer product, with a rank at most equal to r￿ = 1. It was
already present in the fully cooperative case, resulting as already stated from
an aggregation e⁄ect.
The matrix ￿ is new. It expresses an externality e⁄ect, when this e⁄ect
ceases to be compensated by the response of Lindahl taxation to changes in the
environment, as it was in the fully cooperative case. Notice that, because of the
assumption of no regime switching over ￿, if gJ
k = 0 for some k, then @gxJ
n+k = 0
and @(￿;Y )GJ
k = 0, so that the matrix
￿
@gxJ￿
(resp. ￿J) has at most n + mJ
(resp. mJ) non-zero rows, mJ being the number of public goods contributed
by spouse J. In the absence of public consumption or, more generally, under
preference separability, when the utility derived from each spouse￿ s private and
public consumption is una⁄ected by the other spouse￿ s exclusive contributions
to public goods, the matrix
￿
@gxJ￿
vanishes (at least in the regime of separate
spheres), so that ￿ = 0, bringing us back to the result of the fully cooperative
case: the deviation matrix ￿￿￿ has a rank at most equal to 1. But this result
due to inoperative externality e⁄ects is of course lost as soon as we abandon
separability. The generic result requires the rank of the deviation matrix to be
equal to an upper bound introduced in the following proposition (a result ￿rst
formulated by Lechene and Preston, 2008, for the case m￿ = mA+mB ￿￿ = m,
with ￿ = 0 under separate spheres and ￿ = 1;:::;m under joint contribution to
￿ public goods).10
10The upper bound established by Lechene and Preston (2008) is in fact independent of
21Proposition 6 Under full autonomy (￿
A = ￿
B = 1), the household demand







Slutsky matrix ￿ which deviates from a Slutsky matrix ￿ = ￿A+￿B by a matrix
￿ ￿ ￿ of rank at most equal to
r￿￿￿ = 1 + m￿ + min
￿







The upper bound r￿￿￿ can be neither higher than 1+m￿ nor lower than 1 (for
n = 1 and either mA = 1 or mB = 0).
Proof. (Separate spheres) This is the simpler case. We ￿rst determine the
maximum possible rank of ￿. The matrix
￿
@gxJ￿
has at most n + mJ non-






(consumption changes induced by the sole externality e⁄ect should not modify
the expenditure ￿xJ). Hence, the rank of
￿
@gxJ￿
is at most equal to n+mJ ￿1.
The matrix ￿J has at most mJ non-zero rows so that, assuming WLOG that






￿A cannot be higher
than
r￿ = mB + min
￿
n + mB ￿ 1;mA￿
= m￿ + min
￿






Now, by applying Euler￿ s identity to the functions ￿ and xJ, which are homo-
geneous of degree 0, we see that ￿[￿] = ￿[￿] = 0, implying (￿ ￿ ￿)[￿] = 0,
so that the columns of the matrix ￿ ￿ ￿ are not linearly independent. Hence,
the rank of this matrix is at most equal to n+m￿ ￿1, since it has only n+m￿
non-zero columns (variations in the prices of the m￿m￿ public goods which are
actually not consumed by the household cannot induce changes in the spouses￿
contributions). Taking into account this upper bound and simply adding r￿ and
r￿ completes the proof:
r￿￿￿ = min
￿
n + m￿ ￿ 1;1 + m￿ + min
￿





= 1 + m￿ + min
￿







the value of ￿. For simplicity, we have limited our analysis to the generic case ￿ 2 f0;1g. If
m￿ = m (the case contemplated by Lechene and Preston), their result coincides with ours.
22(Joint contribution to one public good) Now suppose that both spouses con-
tribute to the k-th public good. Because of local income pooling, the equilibrium
outcome (except as concerns the way Qk is decomposed into gA
k and gB
k ) will
be the same at given prices and household income if we let spouse A make the
whole purchase of public good k, compensating her by an income transfer from
B equal to PkGB
k . This transfer triggers the appearance of a new component of















is the n+k-th row of the identity
matrix In+m. Clearly, this component does not increase the rank of the deviation
matrix, since it can be added to ￿ without changing its nature of outer product.
Otherwise, the income transfer brings us back to a regime of separate spheres
with mA and mB ￿1 public goods contributed by spouses A and B, respectively.
Hence, the maximum rank of ￿B is now mB ￿ 1. However, the relevant upper
bound for the rank of
￿
@gxB￿
remains n + mB ￿ 1, since we cannot apply in
this context the implication xB
k = 0 =) @gxB
k = 0 imposed by the assumption
of no regime switching over ￿. Indeed, B￿ s marginal willingness to pay for the
k-th public good remains equal to Pk (whereas it is generically smaller than its
price for any non contributed public good), making it eligible for a contribution
by B in response to any perturbation of his environment. By simply reproducing
the argument developed for the case of separate spheres, we thus obtain for the
maximum rank of the deviation matrix:
r￿￿￿ = min
￿






n + mB ￿ 1;mA￿￿
= 1 + m￿ + min
￿







3.4 Intermediate cases (0 < ￿
J < 1, J = A;B)
The analysis of the intermediate cases where both spouses have some degree
of autonomy, but also cooperate through Lindahl taxation, can be seen as a
23generalization of the previous cases. The Jacobian of the household demand














































































































































The matrices ￿A and ￿B are again the Slutsky matrices of the individual
demand functions, and their sum ￿ has the same properties. The matrix ￿,
an outer product, expresses the aggregation e⁄ect. The matrix ￿ expresses
the externality e⁄ects, now including income e⁄ects through Lindahl taxation,
which may increase its maximum rank








But the new element in the decomposition of ￿ is the sum of the two matrices
￿A and ￿B, expressing the substitution e⁄ects of price changes through the
24Lindahl prices. The matrix
￿
@PxJ￿
has at most mJ non-zero columns, since
variations in the prices of the m ￿ mJ public goods to which spouse J does











has the same m￿mJ zero columns.
Hence, the rank of ￿ = ￿A + ￿B is upper bounded by mA + mB = m￿ + ￿.








hold demand function ￿ (￿;Y ) has a pseudo-Slutsky matrix ￿ which deviates
from a Slutsky matrix ￿ = ￿A+￿B by the matrix ￿￿￿+￿, the rank of which
is at most equal to
r￿￿￿+￿ = 1 + 2m￿ + minfn ￿ (m￿ + 2);2￿g.
The upper bound r￿￿￿+￿ can neither be higher than 1 + 2(m￿ + ￿) nor lower
than 1 (for n = m￿ = 1).
Proof. Just add the maximum ranks of ￿, ￿￿ and ￿, as previously established,
and take into account the upper bound of the rank of the deviation matrix, which
has at most n + m￿ ￿ 1 linearly independent non-zero columns (since ￿[￿] =
￿[￿] = 0, implying (￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿)[￿] = 0), to obtain:
min
￿










= 1 + 2m￿ + minfn ￿ (m￿ + 2);2￿g.
The strategy of making the results for the two regimes of separate spheres
and of joint contribution to one public good coincide, by exploiting local income
pooling in the latter regime, does not work here. Indeed, the presence of Lindahl
prices depending upon income distribution makes income pooling incomplete.
Hence, our result on the maximum rank of the deviation matrix is now regime
dependent.
The upper bound imposed upon the rank of the deviation matrix can be
used to test the di⁄erent models of household behavior. Browning and Chiap-
pori (1998) have used this upper bound to discriminate between the unitary




has rank 0, as ￿ = ￿, hence





most 2), and have shown that this test requires at least 5 goods. This require-




cannot be higher than 2 if
the number n+m of goods is not larger than 4 (given the linear dependence of
the columns of ￿ introduced by homogeneity of degree zero of the demand func-
tions). Lechene and Preston (2008) have used the properties of Propositions 5
and 6 to discriminate between the cooperative and the non-cooperative models,
and have shown that this test requires n ￿ m+5. Their Lemma 1 shows indeed




has rank at most n + m ￿ 1, then ￿ can always be expressed
as the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank not higher than r such
that 2r+1 ￿ n+m￿1 (with r = 1+m according to Proposition 6). If we apply
this lemma to our own Proposition 7, we see that n ￿ 3m￿+4￿+5 is needed to
discriminate between full and partial autonomy. If, for instance, there is only
one public good and a single contributor, at least 8 private goods are required.




, given homogeneity of degree 0 of the
demand functions, is then 8. As the observed rank increases from 0 to 8, the
test successively rejects the unitary model (at 2), full cooperation (at 4), full
autonomy (at 6) and the collective model as a whole (at 8).
4 Household decisions under varying degrees of
autonomy: an example
In order to study household decisions when we vary not only the income shares
but also the degrees of autonomy, and to make comparisons with previous results
on the game with voluntary contributions to public goods obtained by Brown-
ing, Chiappori & Lechene (2006b), we use their example, with Cobb-Douglas
preferences over one private good and two public goods. We denote by c and
d the private consumptions of spouses A (the wife) and B (the husband), re-
spectively, and by G and H the quantities of the two public goods. The utility
26functions are given by:
UA (c;G;H) = cG5=3H8=9 and UB (d;G;H) = dG15=32H1=2, (30)
so that A cares more about the ￿rst public good, and B about the second
((5=3)(9=8) > (15=32)2). We further use the following normalization:
p = PG = PH = Y = 1.
The environment in this example is thus described by the vector (1;1;1;1) and
the income distribution by the pair (￿;1 ￿ ￿).
4.1 Income distribution and public consumptions































Straightforward application of ￿rst order conditions (16) for optimal public con-








































with an equality when the corresponding public good receives a positive vol-
untary contribution. Hence, a positive contribution by both spouses to both
public goods would imply that the four inequalities above hold as equalities.








64(1 ￿ ￿) + 63￿￿
B
32(1 ￿ ￿) + 63￿￿
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Figure 1: Household public consumptions as ￿ varies
an equality that can be solved for ￿
J 2 [0;1] and J = A;B only if ￿
A = ￿
B =
0, that is, in the case of the Lindahl equilibrium outcome.11 This illustrates
Proposition 4, implying in this case that the spouses will jointly contribute







of degrees of autonomy, we should expect di⁄erent
equilibrium regimes concerning the contributions for public goods as we increase
A￿ s income share ￿ from 0 to 1: (I) where B is the only spouse to contribute
to (both) public goods, (II) where A contributes to her preferred public good
and B still contributes to both, (III) where each spouse specializes on his/her
preferred public good, (IV) and (V) symmetric to (II) and (I) respectively (with
inverted roles of A and B). Figure 1 illustrates these regimes, for the household
consumptions of the ￿rst and second public goods, when the degrees of autonomy
are (0;0) (the upper thick curves), (1;1) (the lower thick curves) and (1=2;1=2)
(the thin curves). The upper curves, corresponding to the Lindahl equilibrium,
are straight lines, increasing in ￿ for the ￿rst public good (the preferred one),
(slightly) decreasing for the second. The other curves are broken lines, each
kink corresponding to a change of regime.Each lower broken line, portraying the
11The corresponding equality would trivially hold, for any values of ￿, ￿A and ￿B, in the
singular case where both spouses would equally care for the two public goods. See footnote 8.
28Figure 2: Regime switching values of ￿ as ￿ varies
Nash equilibrium outcome of the game with voluntary contributions, exhibits
two horizontal segments (corresponding to regimes II and IV). These segments
illustrate the local income pooling phenomenon formulated in Proposition 2
of Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006b). Such horizontal segments do
not appear in the other broken lines, a feature that illustrates our claim in
Subsection 2.3.
We have represented, as the sole intermediate case between the Lindahl
equilibrium and the fully non-cooperative equilibrium, the case where both de-
grees of autonomy are equal to 1=2, but all other intermediate cases would be
represented by broken lines similarly located between the thick curves. The
non-monotonicity of the household public consumptions as functions of ￿ is a
phenomenon which is not limited to the fully non-cooperative case, but it even-
tually disappears as the degrees of autonomy tend to vanish. Finally, observe
that regime switches occur at di⁄erent values of ￿ for di⁄erent con￿gurations of
the degrees of autonomy. In Figure 2, we have represented the regime switching
values of ￿ as functions of ￿ = ￿
A = ￿
B in the symmetric case of equal degrees
of autonomy. We may notice that the regimes where both spouses contribute to
the same public good tend to expand as individual autonomy tends to vanish.
















Figure 3: Agents￿utilities under symmetric autonomy
4.2 Degrees of autonomy and spouse welfare
Another interesting comparative statics issue consists in looking at the way
the welfare of each spouse varies as the wife￿ s income share increases for the
same three con￿gurations of the degrees of autonomy. We represent in Figure
3 A￿ s and B￿ s utilities as functions of A￿ s income share ￿, when the degrees of
autonomy are (0;0) (the smooth thick curves), (1;1) (the broken thick curves)
and (1=2;1=2) (the thin broken curves).
As expected, A0s (resp. B￿ s) utility is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the
three cases, but the three curves cannot be monotonically ranked in terms of the
(common) degree of autonomy. When a spouse￿ s income share is low, his/her
utility is higher for the fully non-cooperative equilibrium than for the Lindahl
equilibrium. This relationship is reversed as soon as the spouse￿ s income share
is moderately high. In the intermediate case where the degrees of autonomy
are (1=2;1=2), the relationship of the spouse￿ s utility with that obtained at the
Lindahl equilibrium follows the same pattern (the two curves cross only once),
but its relationship with the utility obtained at the fully non-cooperative equi-
librium is more complex (the two curves cross several times). Besides, because
of the absence of local income pooling, the curve corresponding to the case
￿
A = ￿
B = 1=2 does not exhibit the same horizontal segments as the curve
















Figure 4: Agents￿utilities under asymmetric autonomy
corresponding to the case ￿
A = ￿
B = 1.
Figure 4 reproduces the same extreme cases, but the thin broken curves






= (1=4;3=4). We see that the
husband, whose degree of autonomy is higher, tends to attain the highest utility
level in this case. A higher degree of autonomy has a negative e⁄ect on utility
through a loss of e¢ ciency, but this e⁄ect is more than compensated by a positive
redistributive e⁄ect.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of household behavior with both private and pub-
lic consumption, where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but
taking into account, together with their own personal budget constraints, the
collective budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. This
model generalizes both the collective, fully cooperative, model of household be-
havior and the non-cooperative model with voluntary contributions to public
goods. This is achieved in two ways. The ￿rst is through a generalized game of
voluntary contributions where the set of equilibria can be parameterized accord-
ing to the degree of autonomy of each spouse, measured by the relative pressure
of the two budget constraints at equilibrium, personal vs. collective. The second
31is by ￿xing as an exogenous parameter the share of public consumption that is
autonomously taken care of by each spouse. The degrees of autonomy introduce
a complementary dimension to the income shares, allowing to consider varia-
tions of household behavior not only along the Pareto frontier, but also inside
the utility possibility set.
Our analysis has shown that the three types of household behavior (full
cooperation, full autonomy and partial autonomy) impose su¢ cient restrictions
on observed household demand to allow for testability under some conditions on
the number of goods (typically, a number of private goods much higher than the
number of public goods). Further work is needed. In particular, the estimation
of the autonomy parameters would be welcome. This has been done in other
￿elds. The New Empirical Industrial Organization has been estimating the
so-called conduct parameters which measure the relative weight of competitive
toughness and play in the analysis of ￿rm behavior a role similar to the one of
our degrees of autonomy in the analysis of household behavior.
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